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Background
Background
Cyber-Deception and Network Measurement
Internet measurements reliant on (fragile) inferences
Available tools are Tricks and hacks – Internet was not intended to be
measured
Inherent difficulty means researchers are happy to get any results, and
don’t question them
Question:
Should measurement research assumptions include a more adversarial
model?
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Typical assumption for active measurements: a host either responds
(truthfully) or does not
For instance, a non-response:
Firewall or other blocking
Protocol/service/measurement trick not supported
However, a third choice is gaining momentum: deception
Provide a false response to influence adversary’s behavior
Canonical example: honeypots
In our world: fake networks, fake hosts
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Background
Motivation
How prevalent are deceptive
networks/hosts on the Internet?
How do Internet topology scans
treat these “fake” networks?
(Or: how much junk/noise is
creeping into our global
measurements)
Can “fake” networks/hosts be
identified?
IS THIS REAL?? ⇒




This talk focuses on one form of deceptive network behavior: tarpits
Originally conceived as a defensive mechanism
Idea: attempt to slow (or stop) various forms of network scanning
(e.g. for open services)
Two well-known applications:
LaBrea
Linux Netfilter (via TARPIT plugin)
General Idea:
A single machine pretends to be all unused hosts on a subnetwork
Answers for all requests to those fake hosts
By setting TCP window to zero...
And never letting go ...
Let’s look at LaBrea in detail




Two modes of operation:
ARP-timeout – actively captures unused addresses
Hard capture – only listens on specific addresses
LaBrea promiscuously listens for ARP requests
If no answer to (multiple) requests, LaBrea assumes IP not in use...
And claims to be that IP (always with same MAC)
Example: 10.1.10.102 is a real host attempting to connect to
(non-existent) host 10.1.10.210:
06:20:44.848758 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.210 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:45.953257 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.210 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:46.962535 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.210 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:47.970023 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.210 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:47.970130 ARP, Reply 10.1.10.210 is-at 00:00:0f:ff:ff:ff, length 28
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After layer-2 capture, LaBrea responds to TCP and ICMP
Example ping from 10.1.10.102 to 10.1.10.205:
06:20:31.501417 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.205 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:33.501954 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.205 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:34.503146 ARP, Request who-has 10.1.10.205 tell 10.1.10.102, length 46
06:20:34.503257 ARP, Reply 10.1.10.205 is-at 00:00:0f:ff:ff:ff, length 28
06:20:34.504452 IP 10.1.10.102 > 10.1.10.205: ICMP echo request, id 61467, seq 3, length 64
06:20:34.504536 IP 10.1.10.205 > 10.1.10.102: ICMP echo reply, id 61467, seq 3, length 64
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LaBrea also responds to TCP connection attempts to any TCP port
TCP SYN/ACK has an advertised window of 10 (or 3), and no TCP
options
Never ACKs or ACKs with zero window (persistent mode)
Example HTTP from 10.1.10.102 to 10.1.10.210:
06:20:47.971276 IP 10.1.10.102.51161 > 10.1.10.210.http: Flags [S], seq 3536100821, win 65535,
options [mss 1460,nop,wscale 4,nop,nop,TS val 1194569089 ecr 0,sackOK,eol], length 0
06:20:47.971475 IP 10.1.10.210.http > 10.1.10.102.51161: Flags [S.], seq 1457023515, ack 3536100822,
win 10, length 0
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In the lab (where things worked great)
Set up LaBrea tarpit on /29 within Comcast
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Degreaser
Discriminating Characteristics
What Doesn’t Work: Response Time
Does LaBrea respond faster or slower than a real host?
LaBrea is much slower to respond in ARP-timeout mode
Unreliable due to ARP caching
PlanetLab scan to /24 containing
LaBrea
60 Planet Lab nodes
Red dots are LaBrea responses
Blue dots are real host responses
No distinguishable difference when
not running in ARP-timeout mode
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Degreaser
Discriminating Characteristics
What Doesn’t Work: Port Scanning
What about looking for hosts listening on all TCP ports?
Search space too big!
232 × 216 scans
We could search for hosts with more than XX listening ports...
This still requires multiple scans per host
However its easier than that!
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Only one TCP connection per host
Requires sending only 3 packets per host
Not susceptible to network noise (like response time measurements)




To understand how tarpit traffic characteristics differ from “normal”
traffic
We analyze two traffic traces
Trace Duration Packets Bytes Flows
Equinix SanJose (CAIDA) 60s 31M 24G 5.4M
Campus (NPS) 3600s 48M 34G 1.2M
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Equinix and NPS traces showed a very
high percentage of connections that
used TCP options




92.2% At least one option
NPS Trace
0% No options
100% At least one option
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Degreaser
Detection In The Wild
New tool: Degreaser
Network scanner that can detect tarpitting hosts
GPL Licensed (will be available soon)
Multi-threaded, C++
libcrafter for packet manipulation
Host 65.240.192.189 : No response.
Host 62.97.115.180 : Labrea Host. WinSize=3 TCPFlags=SA TCPOptions=
Host 31.202.125.145 : No response.
Host 110.29.8.230 : Rejecting. WinSize=0 TCPFlags=AR TCPOptions=
Host 59.28.4.215 : Real Host. WinSize=14480 TCPFlags=SA TCPOptions=MWST
Host 186.98.169.75 : No response.
Host 144.93.146.200 : No response.
Host 168.62.42.151 : Real Host. WinSize=8192 TCPFlags=SA TCPOptions=MWST
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Degreaser
Detection in the Wild
Degreaser Internals
Sends TCP SYN to host and waits for responding SYN/ACK
Includes MSS, TSVAL, SACK and WSCALE options
Window size. Is it abnormally small?
Small size is good indication of a tarpit
Did any TCP options get returned?
Existence rules out tarpit (except MSS, possibly)
But Wait!
A real host might legitimately have a small window size and not use
options.
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Degreaser
Detection in the Wild
Send a Data Packet
Send a data packet of size one less than the window size
A real host would send an ACK, but neither LaBrea nor Netfilter do!
The data packet can also distinguish between LaBrea and Netfilter:
LaBrea: Won’t respond with ACK unless payload > window size
Netfilter: Immediately sets window to zero.











Does anyone actually admit to using this stuff?
BizSystems (3 IP addresses)
What about on the larger Internet?
scans.io
Began our experiments by looking at scans.io
Idea: degrease networks in order of their occupancy
Didn’t work:
High-occupancy networks were CDNs, hosting centers
scans.io looking for application-layer connects, not just TCP
establishment
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Scanned over 4 million IP addresses from NPS over a 4 week period,
starting in April, 2014
Scanned slowly not to raise suspicion from IT dept.
Used cryptographic permutation to “randomize” the scan
We have scanned at least one host from 25% of the /24 subnets
Found 18 tarpitting hosts directly via degreaser




Of the 18 hosts:
10 were LaBrea (non-persist mode)
6 were LaBrea (persist mode)
16 were address blocks assigned to universities
2 were commercial address blocks
Completed an exhaustive search on subnets containing these hosts
Largest: /20
Over 20, 700 IP addresses
showing tarpit-like behavior.
Across 7 autonomous systems
and 3 countries.
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Experiments
Results
ISI Internet Census Data
Some example from census
data. The indicated blocks of
green cells – high occupancy
subnets? Nope. All fake.
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Experiments
A view from Ark
Impacts Ark traceroute data too...
How many randomly chosen destinations respond to traceroute?




- 130.207.24.20 Status: False
- 130.207.25.62 Status: True
- 130.207.25.98 Status: False
- 130.207.24.149 Status: False
- 130.207.24.156 Status: False




- XXX.YYY.252.89 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.253.62 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.254.164 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.255.86 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.252.133 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.253.6 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.254.148 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.255.6 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.252.98 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.253.136 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.254.76 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.255.232 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.252.203 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.253.127 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.254.26 Status: True
- XXX.YYY.255.80 Status: True











Cyber deception is real
Open question as to whether its use is increasing
But, general caution to measurement researchers to be more
cognizant of deception
What we’ve discovered is in the noise relative to the entire Internet,
but still represents large networks
And significant that we were able to discover these needles in a
haystack





Understand subnets that return zero window (particularly 166/8
Build a better tarpit?
Combine with topology deception?
Measure tarpits (and general deception behavior) over time.
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Summary
Summary
Developed methodology and tool, degreaser, to detect tarpits
Found strong evidence of active tarpits in the Internet
Observations on deception within Internet measurement work
Thanks!
Questions?
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